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Despite increasing attention being paid to the potential harms of online targeting over the last 
year, there is still a lack of clarity over what precisely those harms are. To help address this lack 
of clarity, this submission focuses on question 1: What evidence is there about the harms and 
benefits of online targeting? This question was discussed at a workshop we held on “The 
Methodology and Ethics of Targeting” at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence 
in May 2019 (organized by the authors of this submission, and attended by some members of 
the CDEI). Our submission summarises some of these discussions and attempts to map out 
some of the key researchers, groups, and publications we know are working on various harms of 
targeting. This is not intended to be comprehensive, but we hope will help highlight areas 
worthy of more attention for the CDEI. 
Background: what do we mean by targeting? 
In the call for evidence, the CDEI defines targeting as “the customisation of products and 
services online (including content, services standards and prices) based on data about individual 
users. Instances of online targeting can include online advertising and personalised social media 
feeds and recommendations.” 
 
This definition captures many different forms of targeting, depending on: (a) who is doing the 
targeting (e.g. companies, governments, campaigners); (b) what is being targeted (e.g. adverts, 
														 			
		  
news stories, ‘nudges’, public services); (c) what data is being used and what assumptions about 
users it is used to base targeting on (e.g. assumptions about preferences, personality, or past 
behaviour), and (d) what aims targeting has (e.g. to change beliefs, behaviour, save time or 
money).  
 
Though this definition focuses on online targeting in particular, we suggest that it is worth also 
looking at some literature on ‘offline’ targeting, such as personalised medicine and the targeting 
of public services more generally, as this may provide useful insights into some of the ethical 
challenges of targeting, as well as how those challenges have been tackled in the past. 
 
For the purposes of conducting a thorough review, it’s worth recognising several other terms 
which are used in different literatures to refer to practices very similar to, if not identical to, 
targeting as the CDEI defines it: 
 
● ‘Recommending’ or ‘recommender systems’ (e.g. as used by Milano, Taddeo and 
Floridi, 2019). In some domains, the terms ‘targeting’ and ‘recommending’ are actually 
used to refer to distinct activities (outlined in more detail by Cobbe and Singh, 2019). 
The key difference here is that ‘targeting’ requires active and deliberate selection of 
audiences by the ‘targeter’, whereas ‘recommending’ involves the automated selection 
of content for specific audiences. We take it that the CDEI definition of ‘targeting’ is 
intended to encompass both these practices, and we will use it as such. However, it is 
worth being aware of this distinction, since it has implications for regulation, and 
potentially also which ethical issues are most relevant. 
● ‘Behavioural targeting’ or ‘behavioural advertising’ (Boerman et al., 2017). Cobbe and 
Singh (2019) define ‘behavioural targeting’ as when platforms or advertisers actively 
and deliberately selecting groups for targeting based on behavioural tracking and 
analysis - this therefore sits in the intersection of ‘targeting’ and ‘recommending’ as 
distinguished above. 
● ‘Personalisation’ is also commonly used to refer to a similar activity to targeting. We 
take this to be a subset of targeting, since not all targeting will necessarily be at the 
personal level. 
 
We use ‘targeting’ here broadly, to encompass all of the above terms.  
 
What evidence is there about the harms of online targeting? 
 
We focus on five broad categories of harm from online targeting: (1) threats to privacy; 
(2) undermining autonomy; (3) impact on vulnerabilities; (4) discrimination; and (5) 
undermining societal values (particularly cohesion, democracy, and solidarity). Many of these 
harms will interact with each other: for example, the way targeting impacts vulnerabilities might 
be thought of as a particularly concerning case of undermining autonomy; discrimination 
resulting from targeting may have knock-on effects on social cohesion; and threats to privacy 
within the context of targeting may also threaten to undermine autonomy. 
 
														 			
		  
For each category of harm, we highlight key groups and publications focused on understanding 
this harm. 
 
1. Threats to privacy 
 
Targeting poses risks to individual privacy since it often makes use of personal data, and/or 
motivates drawing inferences from data which can then be used to categorise individuals and 
groups for the purpose of targeting. 
 
● Silvia, Taddeo and Floridi (2019) discuss several ways that recommender systems can 
create privacy risks: from how data is collected and shared; the possibility of data leaks; 
and from inferences about a person that can be drawn from data (which can be highly 
personal, even if the data collected is not, and where it is also possible to draw personal 
inferences about one individual from data about other people.) 
● Wachter and Mittelstadt (2018) more explicitly discuss issues surrounding the 
inferences that can be drawn from data for the purposes of targeting, and explain how 
current data protection law may be insufficient to protect users here. 
● Skopek (2015) discusses fundamental questions about the nature of privacy, privacy 
losses, and privacy violations. He calls into question the widespread assumption that 
privacy rights should be interpreted as providing rights against personal inferences. 
Since much of targeting relies on making inferences about personal traits, this paper 
would suggest that legally protecting one from such inferences could be difficult.  
 
In a sense, these privacy concerns exist independently of targeting, as personal data may be 
acquired and predictions about people made on the basis of data for purposes other than 
targeting. Targeting exacerbates these concerns, however, by motivating the collection and 
processing of personal data for the purposes of profiling. As highlighted in the next section, we 
also suggest that targeting may introduce new issues insofar as privacy is instrumental in 
protecting autonomy, and hence that threats to privacy can contribute to undermining autonomy. 
 
2. Undermining autonomy 
 
Several authors have argued that (at least some forms of) online targeting poses special threats 
to autonomy. By autonomy we mean something like an individual’s ability to reflect on and 
decide freely about their values, actions, and behaviour, and to act on those choices (Vold and 
Whittlestone, forthcoming). For example: 
 
● Susser, Roessler and Nissenbaum (2018) argue that online targeting and 
personalisation are often forms of manipulation. They discuss what distinguishes online 
manipulation from other forms of online influence, as well as providing a clear account 
of the relationship between manipulation and autonomy. Key to their account is the idea 
that online targeting often subverts individuals’ decision-making processes towards the 
“manipulator’s” own ends. 
● Costa and Halpern (2019) similarly raise concerns about how online targeting 
undermines autonomy by exploiting known cognitive biases, and particularly by 
														 			
		  
making it easier for people to express or act on ‘impulsive’ preferences, undermining 
more reflective choices and behaviours. 
● Milano, Taddeo and Floridi (2019) outline several ways that recommender systems 
can encroach on autonomy. They also highlight the related point that algorithmic 
profiling may affect individuals’ ability to form their own personal identity, by 
“removing the users from the social categories that help mediate their experiences of 
identity.” (p.10) 
● Vold and Whittlestone (forthcoming) suggest that online targeting makes threats to 
privacy and threats to autonomy more closely related than ever before, because it is 
becoming easier to use personal data to influence people’s behaviour in ways that 
undermine self-governance, or autonomy. Lanzig (2018) makes a similar point that 
‘self-tracking technologies’ (which provide personalised feedback to users, often for the 
end of helping them achieve self-improvement goals) should be seen as undermining 
not just informational privacy but also decisional privacy: the right against unwanted 
interference in our decisions and actions (which is closely related to autonomy). 
 
Overall, there is a strong literature making a theoretical case that online targeting undermines 
autonomy (at least in some cases.) There is less empirical evidence on where specifically and 
how these harms are taking place, however it also remains unclear and somewhat controversial, 
what form such evidence would take. 
 
3. Impact on vulnerabilities 
 
Susser, Roessler and Nissenbaum (2018) draw a useful distinction between “ontological 
vulnerabilities” - vulnerabilities that all humans share, which arise because of limits on human 
cognition, from “contingent vulnerabilities”, which arise because of structural conditions or 
differences between individuals (e.g. vulnerabilities resulting from economic disadvantage or 
being part of a minority group, or suffering from mental health issues.) 
 
It seems that exploiting ontological vulnerabilities is a large part of what can make targeting 
manipulative in general (undermining rational decision-making processes), but there are also 
important concerns about how targeting can be used to exploit more contingent vulnerabilities, 
i.e. groups or individuals who are especially vulnerable. 
 
The above authors give a concrete example of how advertisers were able to use Facebook’s 
platform to target adverts at teenagers when they are feeling stressed, anxious, overwhelmed or 
similarly vulnerable. 
 
Costa and Halpern (2019) also discuss how time online in general may impact mental health, 
pointing to evidence of two potential factors: negative feelings due to hurtful interactions or 
negative content, and substituting time away from wellbeing-enhancing activities. Insofar as 
online targeting may increase addictive behaviour online and also make it easier for people to 
access negative content, targeting may exacerbate these problems. 
 
Groups working with particularly vulnerable populations are also beginning to raise concerns 
about how targeting may affect those groups. For example, the What Works Centre for 
														 			
		  
Children’s Social Care recently commissioned a review to be done by the Public Policy team 
at the Alan Turing Institute into the ethical issues surrounding the use of machine learning in 
children’s social care, including concerns about the ethics of targeting interventions. 
 
4. Discrimination 
 
There is some evidence that forms of targeting can lead to discrimination. 
 
● Wachter (2019) discusses discrimination issues associated with ‘affinity profiling’ used 
in behavioural advertising, i.e. where people are targeted not based on explicit sensitive 
characteristics, but rather on assumed interests or characteristics based on ‘affinity’ wth 
some group. Wachter cites evidence from a study by Sweeney (2013) which shows that 
behavioural advertising can reinforce racial stereotypes and other forms of 
discrimination. 
● Speicher et al. (2018) outline different ways that Facebook advertisers can target in a 
discriminatory manner (i.e. including or excluding users from adverts based on sensitive 
categories like race.) Jan and Dwoskin (2019) highlight how Facebook is currently 
being sued by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development for allowing 
advertisers to target housing advertisements based on race, gender, and other protected 
characteristics. There are two key aspects to how this discrimination in targeted 
advertising is possible: (1) Facebook had explicit targeting options to exclude certain 
groups from adverts (Angwin, Tobin, and Varner, 2017), but also (2) algorithms for 
targeting exacerbate the problem because they show adverts to more people who are 
‘similar to’ those who have already clicked on it (Ali et al., 2019) 
● The Data Justice Lab at Cardiff University, co-directed by Dr. Lina Dencik, Dr. Arne 
Hintz, and Dr. Joanna Redden, are also doing important work on the harms of the 
“datafication” of society, particularly focusing on discrimination and impacts on social 
justice - see for example the Data Harm Record1 which provides a running record of 
harms that have been caused by ‘datafication’. 
● Ribeiro et al. (2019) draw a useful distinction between targeting opportunities (e.g. ads 
for employment, housing, banking services), and targeting divisive issues (e.g. 
information about immigration, Brexit, same-sex marriage, abortion), suggesting that 
the two raise distinct concerns. Targeting opportunities is more likely to lead to explicit 
discrimination, while targeting divisive issues is more likely to create broader societal 
discord. That said, the two may be more closely related than they seem, since explicit 
discrimination may lead indirectly to undermining social cohesion via making certain 
groups feel excluded from society, as suggested by Costa and Halpern, 2019. 
 
 
5. Undermining societal values 
 
Several different groups and authors discuss how targeting may make it harder to trust 
information and content online, may make propaganda or misinformation campaigns more 
                                               
1 https://datajusticelab.org/data-harm-record/ 
														 			
		  
effective, may exacerbate ‘filter bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’, all of these leading to reduced 
societal cohesion, threatening the public sphere and our ability to cooperate to solve problems: 
 
● Walker et al. (2019) raise concerns about how targeting exacerbates the threat of 
propaganda and misinformation, making it even easier for actors to exploit the intent to 
persuade and manipulate population at a distance by tailoring messages to specific 
audiences. Chessen (2018) raises similar concerns about how AI will “provide 
propagandists radically enhanced capabilities to manipulate humans minds.” It is worth 
noting here that the concern is not just that people will be more likely to believe false 
things, but that widespread dis/misinformation will lead people to question the notion of 
truth more broadly, and result in widespread mistrust of all information (see for 
example, this talk on “The Future of the Post-Truth World” by Prof Rae Langton.) 
● Even beyond explicit dis/misinformation, targeting may cause or exacerbate what Data 
& Society’s Danah Boyd calls the “fragmentation of truth” (Boyd, 2019): a world 
where different groups of people increasingly live in their own very separate realities 
with different versions of the truth. Similar concerns have been raised by others that 
targeting will exacerbate filter bubbles and echo chambers (Costa and Halpern, 2019); 
Chakraborty et al. (2017) attempt to clearly define and quantify concerns about such 
“knowledge segregation”. 
● The concern here is not just that targeting could worsen the fragmentation of society, 
but that it is likely to also exacerbate conflict and discord between different social 
groups with competing versions of reality: Ribeiro et al. (2018) discuss the impact of 
targeted political adverts focused explicitly on polarizing topics, for example. The 
authors present empirical work indicating that targeted adverts on divisive issues are 
less likely to get reported than non-targeted adverts, as the communities they are 
targeted at are typically more likely to agree with the content and hence less likely to 
report their content as problematic. 
● We suggest that it is worth the CDEI drawing on evidence and research from those 
working on misinformation and the fragmentation of truth more generally, in order to 
think clearly about how targeting interacts with some of these problems: for example, 
RAND work on “truth decay”2, work from the Oxford Internet Institute on 
“computational propaganda”3, and work from King’s College London on “weaponising 
news” (Ramsey and Robershaw, 2019) . 
 
There is also research on how personalised targeting, especially in public services and 
opportunities, may undermine ideals of solidarity and citizenship in society.  
 
● There is a substantial literature on solidarity in personalised medicine (see e.g. 
Prainsack, 2014, 2018), which argues that personalisation in healthcare will lead to 
“greater individualisation of medicine”, decreasing people’s willingness to contribute to 
systems that support everyone equally. Though this literature focuses mostly on an 
‘offline’ form of personalisation, it is worth considering how online targeting and 
personalisation may risk undermining ideals of solidarity that in turn undermine social 
support systems in other domains (such as e.g. insurance).  
                                               
2 https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay.html 
3 https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/projects/computational-propaganda/ 
														 			
		  
● Hintz, Dencik and Wahl-Jorgensen (2018) argue that the way citizens are 
increasingly “monitored, categorized, sorted and profile” requires us to fundamentally 
rethink our understanding of digital citizenship. 
Concluding remarks 
 
Existing research highlights several different ways that online targeting may (and is already 
beginning) cause harm to individuals and society. Though by no means comprehensive, we have 
tried to map out some of the key researchers and groups working on different aspects of these 
harms. Some of this research has begun to point to concrete evidence of how harms are already 
occurring, such as the ways that targeting is enabling and exacerbating forms of discrimination 
and threats to privacy. Other research is more speculative, pointing to harms that seem likely to 
occur in future given evidence about how targeting is being used across society, such as 
undermining autonomy, social cohesion, and solidarity. Though the evidence on these harms is 
currently less solid, we suggest that these more speculative areas may be particularly important 
for the CDEI to focus on understanding going forwards, precisely because these harms are more 
likely to go unnoticed (whereas, for example, threats to privacy and discrimination are already 
receiving more direct attention).  
 
Finally, we should note that of course we recognise the many ways targeting can be beneficial: 
in providing people with online services much better tailored to their needs, for example. We 
have chosen to focus on the harms in this submission for the sake of focus and because we feel 
that they are currently less well understood. We do believe, however, that any policy 
recommendations related to online targeting must take into account both the harms and benefits 
and work to balance any tensions between the two. 
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